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Abstract 
This note provides an explanation for the 'declining-price anomaly' in sequential sec­
ond price auctions. We illustrate how the average winning bids of risk neutral agents 
bidding for objects with valuations drawn from independent, identical distributions are 
lower in later auctions than in earlier auctions. When the objects are not identical we 
determine the optimal order in which they should be auctioned. 
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A NOTE ON SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS 
Dan Bernhardt and David Scoones 
This note explores multi-object, sequential, private-value auctions. We 
seek to capture phenomena such as bidding by a firm for construction 
contracts, oil drilling concessions, or workers, where because of constraints 
imposed by its physical resources or the number of its job openings, each 
bidder is limited in the number of objects it can acquire. 
Ashenfelter [1989], Ashenfelter and Genesove [1992], and McAfee and 
Vincent [1993] document a puzzling 'declining-price anomaly' : in sequential 
auctions, mean sale prices for identical objects fall in later auctions by �% 
to 1�%1 McAfee and Vincent observe that these findings are difficult to 
reconcile with accepted theory. Weber [1983] shows that in sequential 
auctions of identical objects with risk neutral bidders who hold independent 
private values, the expected sale prices in each auction are identical. 
Further, if there is affiliation in values, then expected prices should rise 
in later auctions because early auctions release information, thereby reducing 
winner's curse concerns. 
explanations are problematic. 
McAfee and Vincent show that risk aversion 
Pure strategy equilibria with declining prices 
require non-decreasing absolute risk aversion, something that does not seem to 
reasonably characterize individuals' attitudes toward risk. 
In this paper, we first consider a simple variant in which each bidder's 
valuations are identically distributed across the objects to be auctioned but 
are not perfectly correlated. Even though bidders are risk neutral, mean sale 
prices fall. Second, we determine which object should be auctioned first when 
bidder valuations are not identically distributed across objects. 
The intuition for why prices fall in the sequential auction of 
independently distributed, stochastically equivalent objects is most easily 
understood by comparison with Weber's [1983] model of a second price 
sequential auction of identical items. Weber shows that the symmetric 
equilibrium strategies call for agents to bid less than their valuations in 
earlier auctions to account for the option value of participating in later 
auctions; the profit they expect to earn were they to participate in 
subsequent auctions. Because the objects are identical, bidders with higher 
valuations in the first round have higher option values, so they discount 
1 
their early bids by a greater amount than low valuation bidders. All gains to 
waiting are arbitraged away, and the expected sale price in the two auctions 
is the same. 
In the present model, when submitting their bids in the first auction, 
bidders recognize that if they do not win, then all bidders in the second 
auction expect the same profit from bidding on the second object. Since this 
option value is the same for each first auction participant, each discounts 
its bid in the first auction by the same amount. 
Consequently, relative to when objects are exactly identical, when objects 
are stochastically identical, bidders with high valuations in the first round 
discount their bids by less, and those with low valuations discount by more. 
The key to the declining price result is that when there are sufficiently many 
bidders, it is usually the bidders with high valuations who determine its 
price; the reduced (relative to Weber's model) discount of these bidders is 
what leads expected prices to fall in later auctions. 
We then show that sellers of objects with different distributions of 
buyer valuations should first auction objects that feature the greatest 
variation in buyer valuations. For instance, if the distribution of valuations 
for one object is degenerate, it should be auctioned last. Then bidders do not 
discount their bids in the first auction, and the identity of the winner of 
the first object has no effect on the sale price in the second auction. Were 
the auction order reversed, then the bids for the sure object would be 
discounted by the expected profits from participating in the second auction, 
and the 'wrong' bidder may win the first auction. Selling the object with the 
less dispersed buyer valuations last minimizes both the discount of bids from 
true valuations in the first auction and the cost of having fewer bidders in 
the second. 
The Model. 
There are N 2: 3 bidders who may bid for two objects that are to be 
auctioned sequentially 'in second price, sealed bid, -private-value auctions. 
There is no entry fee, and resale is prohibited. Further, each bidder can win 
only one object. Bidders do not know their own valuations of the second object 
2 until after the first auction has taken place We initially assume that each 
agent's valuations are dra;x1n from identical and independent distributions. 
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Let h).) be the continuous density from which bidders draw their 
(bounded, positive) valuations of object j. Let V;j be i's valuation of object 
j and let ll;j be i's expected profit in auction j (which may be conditioned on 
v,,, v;z). Let bu be the bid submits in auction j. Define f)n) to be the 
first order statistic in auction j when there are n bidders and let s)n) be 
the second order statistic. 
In the second auction, each bidder submits a bid equal to its valuation, 
and the winner pays the second highest bid. Each agent has ex ante identical 
chances of winning. Hence, bidders expect second auction profits of 
n;z(N-1) 
= 1/(N-1) E{f2(N-l) - s2(N-l)). 
ll;z is the option value of not winning the first auction. This is equal to the 
value of participating in the second auction since a bidder can only win one 
object. In the first auction, standard arguments demonstrate that a bidder's 
equilibrium strategy is to shade its bid by the expected value of 
participation in the second auction, r 12: Bidding below v,, - ll;z reduces the 
probability of winning in the first auction only when the gain exceeds the 
expected value of participation in the second auction; bidding above v,, - ll;z 
increases the probability of winning only when the expected profit is less 
than the expected value of participation in the second auction. 
that bids must be non-negative, this reasoning implies: 
Recognizing 
(1) 
Assuming the minimum valuation exceeds n,,. expected sale prices are then 
E(P1) = E{s1(N)) - 1/(N-1) E{f2(N-1) - s2(N-1)}; 
E(P2) = E{s2(N-l)). 
Taking differences and rearranging we find 
1 N-2 E(P1) - E(P2) = E{s,(N)) - [E{N_1f2(N-l) + N- l s2(N-l))]. (2) 
That is, the difference,. in expected sale prices -is equal to the expected 
second order statistic with N bidders minus a weighted average of the first 
and second order statistics when there are N-1 bidders. 
Example 1: Suppose valuations are independently and uniformly distributed on 
[1,2]. In auction 2, the expected first and second order statistics are l+(N-
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l)/N and l+(N-2)/N, respectively, so that the winner's expected profit is l/N. 
In the first auction, each bidder shaves l/[(N-l)N] from its valuation when 
bidding. The expected sale price in the first auction is then 
3 E(P1) = l+(N-1)/(N+l) - l/[(N-l)N] > E(P2) = l+(N-2)/N for N > 3. • 
Example 2: Suppose valuations are independently and identically distributed 
and take on the value 2 with probability p and 1 with probability 1-p. Then 
the expected sale prices in each auction are given by 
E(P,) = 2[1- (1-p)N . - Np(l-p)N-l] + 1[0-p)N - Np(l-p)N-l] - p(l-p)N-2
= 2 - (1-p)N - Np(l-p)N-1 - p(l-p)
N-2;
[ N-1 N-21 [ N-1 N-21E(P,) = 2 1 - (1-p) - (N-l)p(l-p) + 1 (1-p) - (N-l)p(l-p) 
N-1 N-2 = 2 - (1-p) - (N-l)p(l-p) , 
so that 
E(P,) - E(P2) = p(l-p)N-2[(N-l)p - l] > 0 if N > l+p. p • 
These examples illustrate that when there are sufficiently many bidders 
that the expected second highest bidder has a high valuation, then relative to 
when identical objects are auctioned, the average amount by which the second 
highest bidder discounts its first auction bid from its true values is less. 
The consequence is that average sale prices fall. 
The above analysis assumes that a seller will accept a bid below the 
lowest possible valuation of any bidder in the first auction. If the seller 
sets a reserve price equal to the lowest possible bidder valuation, this 
reduces the ability of a low-valuation bidder in the first auction to shade 
his bid, further driving up the difference between the first auction price and 
the second. 
There are two interesting cases to consider: (1) participation in the 
first auction is a precondition for participation in the second auction, so 
that a low-valuation bidder submits the reserve price; (2) a bidder can 
participate in either auction so that a low-valuation bidder does not bid in 
the first auction because its maximum profit there is less than the value of 
participating in the second auction. 
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Continuing Example 2, in the first scenario, where a low-valuation bidder 
submits the reserve price of 1, the expected price and hence profit in the 
second auction are unaffected by the reserve price, but the expected price in 
the first auction is increased by [(1-p)N + Np(l-p)N-l]p(l-p)N-2 to:
E(P,) = 2[1 - (1-p)N - Np(l-p)N-ll + 1((1-p)N + Np(l-p)N-ll -
(l _ (1-p)N _ Np(l-p)N-l)p(l-p)N-2
= 2 - (1-p)N - Np(l-p)N-1 - [1 - (1-p)N - Np(l-p)N-l]p(l-p)N-2.
In the second scenario, with probability (1-p)N, no one participates in
the first auction, so that the first object is not be sold and there are N 
bidders 
auction 
in the second auction. Consequently, 
. 2 2N-2 increases by (N-l)p (1-p) to
the expected price in the second 
The expected price in the first auction given that there is a sale is 
increased to 
E(P,) = 1-(1-p) - N�(l-p) [2 _ p(l-p)N-2[l-p(l-p)N-1J) + Np( l-p ) N l 
[
N N-1] [ N-1] 
1-(1-p ) 1-(1-p) 
[ N N-1][ N-2] [ N N-1] > 1 - (1-p) - Np(l-p) 2 - p(l-p) + (1-p) + Np(l-p) 1, 
which exceeds the expected price in the first auction were there no reserve 
price by [(1-p)N + Np(l-p)N-l]p(l-p)N-2, an increase which exceeds that in the
second auction. 
The reserve price only binds in the first auction. Hence, introducing a 
reserve price equal to the lowest possible bidder valuation drives up the 
expected sale price in the first auction, thus magnifying the 'declining-price 
anomaly.' 
Different Objects 
Suppose the seller plans to auction two objects with different 
distributions of buyer valuations. Which object should the seller auction 
first? The answer is unambiguous if buyer valuation distributions can be 
ordered by the following notion of dispersion: 
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Definition: Buyer valuation distribution A is said to have more dispersed 
order statistics than distribution B if 
Al. E{fA(N-1)} - E{sA(N-1)} <= E{f8(N-l)} - E{s8(N-l)} 
A2. E{sA(N)} - E{sA(N-1)} <= E{s8(N)} - E{s8(N-l)}, 
where f k is the first order statistic and sk is the second order statistic 
from buyer valuation distribution k, k=A,B. 
For example, if the cumulative distribution of a bidder's valuations 
satisfies 
HA(x) = H8(x/a + c), a > 1, Vx 
(e.g. valuations are uniformly distributed and distribution A has a greater 
support) then distribution A has more dispersed order statistics than B. 
Similarly, if the valuation distribution B is degenerate, then distribution A 
is more dispersed than B. In many common families of bidder valuation 
distributions the notion of dispersion of order statistics either corresponds 
to a measure of variance (e.g. normal, uniform, Poisson, 2 point 
distributions), or is captured by one of the parameters characterizing the 
distribution. 
Proposition: Suppose the distribution of buyer valuations for object A is more 
dispersed than the distribution for object B. Then the seller's expected 
revenues are greater if object A is auctioned first. 
Proof: The difference in expected profit from auctioning object A before B is: 
E{sA(N)} - [E{f8(N-l)} - E{s8(N-1)}]/(N-1) + E{s8(N-1)} -
[E{s8(N)} - [E{fA(N-1)} - E{sA(N-1)}]/(N-l) + E{sA(N-1))] 
= [E{sA(N)} + E{s8(N-1)}] - [E{s8(N)} + E{sA(N-1)}] 
(3) 
- [E{f8(N-l)} - E{s8(N-l)}]/(N-1) + [E{fA(N-1)} - E{sA(N-l)}]/(N-1) > 0. 
The first line of (3) is positive from A2 and Al implies that the second line 
of (3) is positive. • 
Stated intuitively, when the object with the greater dispersion in buyer 
valuations is auctioned first, there are more bidders around to bid up the 
price. As well, the expected profits associated with purchasing good B are 
lower, so that bidders do not discount their first bids by as much. This is 
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easiest to see when the distribution of valuations for object B is degenerate. 
If B is auctioned first, each bidder discounts its valuation by its expected 
profit from participating in the second auction. Further, if the winner of 
object B had one of the two highest valuations of good A, then the sale price 
of object A is reduced as well. In contrast, if A is auctioned first then 
bidders do not discount their bids for A, since there is no profit from 
winning object B in the second auction. 
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End Notes 
1 Ashenfelter [1989] and McAfee and Vincent [1993] investigate auctions of
identical cases of wine; Ashenfelter and Genesove examine auctions of 
(virtually identical) condominiums, 
21n independent work, Gale and Hausch [1992] consider a two bidder version of 
Example 1, in which each bidder knows both of its object valuations prior to 
the first auction, They show that declining prices still emerge when the 
information structure is changed in this way, One conjectures that the result 
extends to more competitive auctions featuring more than two bidders, 
3when N=3, the expected sale price in each auction is the same, 
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